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Strategic Diversity in Union 
Political Action: Implications 
for the 1992 House Elections 
RICHARD W. HURD 
Cornell University 
JEFFREY E. SOHL 
University of New Hampshire 
It was a difficult year for the labor movement in the political arena 
in 1991. Labor was unable to attract enough supporters in either house 
of Congress for the simple majority required to deny President Bush 
"fast track" authorization to negotiate a free trade pact with Mexico. 
Although the House passed a bill banning the hiring of permanent 
replacement workers during strikes, the margin of victory was 
insufficient to override an inevitable presidential veto. Support for the 
legislation also appears to be lukewarm in the Senate, with concern 
that there may not be the 60 votes required to stop a filibuster when 
the bill comes to the floor early in 1992. These are the two highest 
visibility issues of interest to organized labor, but similar obstacles 
have confronted other priorities, including family leave legislation and 
health care reform. 
The legislative logjam has caused many labor leaders to reevaluate 
their political strategy. Several options have been promulgated. Some 
have suggested making fast track and/or permanent replacements 
litmus test issues and withdrawing labor support from all opponents. 
Others have made a more general call for ending "blind support" for 
Democrats. To most this means being more selective in deciding 
which Democrats to support, although for a few unions increased 
support for Republicans who have been cooperative on selected 
narrow issues appears likely. Some labor leaders have gone so far as to 
suggest that unions find their own candidates, or even consider 
forming a Labor Party. 
Hurd's Address: 208 ILR Conference Center, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14851-
0952. 
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The purpose of this paper is to explore labor's strategic options in 
the 1992 elections. We will focus on House races because the diversity 
in political strategies among unions is most apparent there. However, 
our conclusions will have broader implications for union activity in 
elections at all levels of government. In evaluating the situation we will 
consider the impact of redistricting on labor's alternatives. We should 
note that recent developments have made many union political 
operatives more optimistic. The upset victory by populist Democrat 
Harris Wofford in the special Senate election in Pennsyvlania, the 
eventual compromises on civil rights legislation and extended 
unemployment benefits, and President Bush's decline in popularity all 
increase the stakes as the labor movement searches for the appropriate 
tactical approach to the pending campaigns. 
Diverse Political Strategies of Labor PACs 
As a framework for analysis we will rely on a taxonomy of labor 
Political Action Committees (PACs) that we have developed in 
research on the 1984 and 1986 House elections (Hurd and Sohl, 1992). 
In that research, we use principal component analysis to uncover 
underlying diversity in union political contribution patterns, and then 
employ cluster analysis to group PACs of individual unions with others 
that display similar patterns. 
Table 1 summarizes the results. To facilitate interpretation, we 
report the patterns for only the 40 unions with the largest PAC 
donation totals. Unions toward the left side of the table follow an 
"electoral" approach, supporting candidates generally sympathetic to 
labor's agenda who are involved in closely contested elections. Unions 
toward the right side of the table pursue "access," concentrating their 
efforts on incumbents who either have proven themselves by their 
voting records to be friends of labor, or hold key positions in the 
House. Accordingly, the proportion of PAC donations going to 
incumbents increases from as low as 30 percent for unions on the left 
hand of the table to above 90 percent for some unions on the right 
hand of the table. 
The marginal list referred to on the table is a list of races selected 
by the AFL-CIO's House Marginal Committee. The marginal 
committee meets regularly during each election year and chooses a 
limited number of races (45 in 1990) that deserve special attention 
from the labor movement. To be considered for inclusion, a candidate 
must be endorsed by the Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
(usually at a special convention held in each state), and be involved in 
00 
o to 
TABLE 1 
Union PAC Contribution Strategies 
Notes: Strategic categories based on Hurd and Sohl (1992) and additional unpublished research. 
Standard abbreviations as indexed in Gifford (1990). 
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USA 
BSOIW 
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Balanced 
Approach 
AFGE 
AFSCME 
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a close race from which he/she has a reasonable chance of emerging 
victorious. Most unions listed on Table 1 are represented on the House 
Marginal Committee. 
As used on the table, "Support for Friends" refers to unions that 
donate a large proportion of their funds to incumbents with high 
COPE scores, whether or not they are involved in close elections. 
"Balanced Approach" refers to those unions who attempt to lend 
support both to marginal list candidates and to friendly incumbents. 
The unions in the two right hand columns all have a primary 
membership base in transportation. For these unions narrow 
regulatory issues are key legislative concerns. Their PAC contributions 
reflect this, with almost all of their support going to incumbents, and 
special attention given to members of selected House committees 
(especially Public Works and Transportation, and Merchant Marines) 
regardless of political party or ideology. 
Strategic Alternatives for 1992 
In an apparent break from past practices, a number of labor 
leaders have become quite vocal about specific litmus test issues. 
Some have chosen to focus on fast track authorization, including 
William Bywater, President of the IUE, and William Holayter, 
political director of the I AM. Others have suggested that permanent 
replacements should be a litmus test issue, including Morton Bahr, 
President of the CWA. 
Implications of applying these litmus test issues can be drawn from 
Table 2. Fast track authorization won by a large margin in the House, 
with labor succeeding in attracting only 34.1 percent of the vote (on a 
related vote for fast track extension labor improved its support to 45.3 
percent). The results were not much better among House members 
whose campaigns received donations from labor PACs in 1990. Even 
among those with 1990 COPE endorsements only a bare majority 
voted with their union friends. Unions that choose to use fast track as 
a litmus test will be denying funds to many candidates who have been 
allies on most issues. 
Labor fared much better in the House on the vote to ban perma-
nent replacements for strikers. Although a substantial minority of those 
who received some labor financial support in 1990 voted "wrong," 
every House member who was on the 1990 marginal list and almost all 
of those who benefited from COPE endorsements supported the 
union position. Using permanent replacements as a litmus test would 
be less limiting and therefore acceptable to more unions. 
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TABLE 2 
1991 House Votes on Key Labor Issues 
Total House 
Percent Right 
1990 Labor PAC $ 
Percent Right 
1990 COPE 
Endorsement 
Percent Right 
1990 Marginal List 
Percent Right 
Percent of Wrong 
Fast Track 
148-274 
34.1 
144-238 
37.7 
122-114 
51.7 
21-13 
61.8 
Permanent 
Replacement 
of Strikers 
247-182 
57.6 
238-140 
63.0 
218-20 
91.6 
34-0 
100.0 
Family Leave 
253-177 
58.8 
242-135 
64.2 
203-36 
84.9 
30-4 
88.2 
COPE > 70$ 34.4 1.5 4.1 
Notes: Votes as reported in AFL-CIO b and c (1991) and Kraus (1991). 
Information on 1990 marginal list provided by David (1991). 
Information on 1990 COPE endorsements provided by Ingrayo (1991). 
Data on labor PAC contributions reported in Federal Election Commission 
(1991). 
Key political operatives in the labor movement are skeptical about 
using any litmus test issue. Rick Diegel of the IBEW, who chairs the 
Senate Marginal Committee, calls the idea "ridiculous," adding that 
"narrow criteria would be the kiss of death . . . [because] we survive 
on coalitions" (Diegel, 1991). Marta David of COPE, who chairs the 
House Marginal Committee, concurs, although she admits that 
"specific votes will be more important this cycle than in the past," and 
notes that some candidates are likely to be denied spots on the 
marginal list as a result (David, 1991). Joe Standa of the NEA states 
simply, "We are not a single issue union" (Standa, 1991) and most labor 
political officials would probably echo this position. 
The impact of redistricting raises further questions about the 
advisability of applying a litmus test in 1992. As Table 3 reveals, states 
that are gaining House seats are less friendly to unions than those that 
are losing seats. The differences are greater on fast track and 
permanent replacements than on the broader agenda. A focus on 
either of these issues would severely limit the influence of unions in the 
states whose House delegations are growing. 
UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 305 
TABLE 3 
Impact of House Redisricting on Support for Labor Issues 
COPE Scores 
Democrat 
Republican 
Total 
Adjusted 
Fast Track 
Democrat 
Republican 
Total 
Adjusted 
States Gaining Seats 
Percent Right 
76.2 
12.2 
48.7 
40.1 
33.9 
9.7 
23.4 
17.7 
Permanent Replacements 
Democrat 
Republican 
Total 
Adjusted 
91.9 
0.0 
45.2 
33.4 
States Losing Seats 
Percent R 
86.9 
26.9 
63.4 
71.4 
62.1 
14.2 
42.3 
50.0 
97.4 
18.6 
64.7 
76.6 
ght 
Net Change in 
Right Votes 
-2 .8 
-5 .9 
-3 .6 
-6 .1 
-3 .7 
-8 .2 
Notes: Right votes and COPE scores as reported by the AFL-CIO (1991 a,b,c). 
All data are weighted by the number of seats gained or lost by each state. 
Adjusted data are based on gains or losses by party in each state as forecast 
by Gersh (1991) and Cohen (1991). 
Although the idea of a specific litmus test issue is unlikely to prove 
fruitful, the heightened awareness of unions to their legislative 
difficulties may prompt them to be more selective in their campaign 
contributions in 1992. By denying support to those incumbents who 
have not voted with labor on some narrow range of key issues, it may 
be possible to utilize limited funds more effectively. The third key 
vote included in Table 2 (family leave) was selected to represent 
broader social issues which receive legislative priority from labor. 
When taken together, the three issues should offer a concise and 
reasonable measure of a House member's 1991 labor voting record. 
In 1990 labor PACs donated $854,965 to winning candidates who 
subsequently voted wrong all three issues. An additional $385,640 was 
donated to candidates who voted right on family leave, but wrong on 
both fast track and permanent replacements (Federal Election 
Commission, 1991). Included in this group were 14 House members 
who were endorsed by COPE in 1990. Segundo Mercado-Lorens, 
Director of Government Affairs for the UFCW, although resistant to 
the idea of a specific litmus test issue, concedes that it would be 
difficult to defend contributions to incumbents who voted wrong on 
both fast track and replacements, and inconceivable for those voting 
r 
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wrong on all three issues (Mercado-Lorenz, 1991). In this spirit, 
withholding COPE endorsements and PAC donations from unreliable 
incumbents would be a modest signal that standards are tightening. 
Not all unions will be responsive of course. As noted above, unions 
in the transportation sector pursue a rather narrow access strategy 
designed to secure legitimate regulatory objectives to benefit their 
members. As reflected in Table 4, this approach often results in 
significant contributions to conservatives. As Jerry Baker of ALPA 
explained it, "We have narrow issues, and we have to demonstrate to 
our members that PAC contributions are useful in getting our job 
done . . . We need Republicans to pass legislation" (Baker, 1991). Of 
the 19 conservative House members for whom detailed donations 
were calculated in the middle column of Table 3 (based on receipt of 
at least $10,000 from labor PACs in 1990), 12 serve on a key 
transportation committee and six others held key positions on other 
powerful committees (Ways and Means, Appropriations, or Rules). 
TABLE 4 
Labor PAC Support for Conservatives 
(1) 
Percent of PAC 
Funds Donated to 
Conservatives 
(2) 
Donations to House 
Members With Wrong 
Votes on Key Issues 
(3) 
Donations to Candi-
dates Supported 
by National Right 
To Work Committee 
MEBA 
ILA 
SIU 
RLCA 
ALPA 
RLE 
UTU 
IBT 
IUOE 
UMW 
39.5 
30.0 
24.9 
22.0 
20.1 
19.5 
16.7 
13.7 
12.1 
11.1 
MEBA 
IBT 
ALPA 
SIU 
NALC 
UTU 
ILA 
CJA 
IUOE 
NEA 
$78,200 
54,500 
52,300 
34,500 
31,400 
15,900 
14,050 
12,817 
9,500 
9,150 
MEBA 
ALPA 
IBT 
SIU 
ILA 
NALC 
' LIUNA 
UTU 
NEA 
AFSCME 
$66,500 
19,750 
13,250 
12,850 
9,050 
8,500 
4,350 
4,050 
3,977 
3,500 
Notes: Data from 1986 Federal Election Commission Tapes for 1986 (column 1) and 
1988 (columns 2 and 3). 
Column (2) refers to House members voting wrong on all three votes 
designated in Table 2. 
Standard union abbreviations as indexed in Gifford (1990). 
Although transportation unions may have a reasonable rationale for 
supporting conservatives, there should be room to persuade them to 
increase their contributions to open races and challengers without 
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abandoning their own bipartisan allies in Congress. Furthermore, they 
are not the only unions that donate to conservatives as Table 3 reveals. 
In fact in 1988 (the last year for which detailed data by PAC are 
available), 29 different unions donated money to campaigns that were 
also financially supported by the National Right to Work Committee. 
Increased diligence could redirect financial support from these 
opponents of labor's broad agenda to more deserving candidates. 
A strategic option which has been promoted by some friends of 
labor is to break from the past and pursue a more progressive agenda. 
Rich Trumka, President of the UMW, and Edward Carlough, 
President of the SMW, endorse this view. Tony Mazzocchi of OCAW 
has gone one step further, calling for a labor party and creating Labor 
Party Advocates to promote the idea. The wishes of labor progressives 
notwithstanding, a dramatic shift in the union movement's political 
agenda is unlikely. In our research using 1986 FEC data, we were 
unable to detect any unions that pursue a political strategy that can be 
distinguished from other unions as notably more left wing. It is 
unlikely that 1992 will prove to be any different on this score. 
Perhaps the most positive way to channel discontent with 
incumbents among unions would be to promote increased adherence 
to the marginal list. As reflected in Table 2, members of Congress who 
benefited from being included on the 1990 marginal list have excellent 
labor voting records. A review of total 1990 labor PAC contributions to 
specific candidates helps explain why. Of the 29 current House 
members who received $150,000 or more in labor PAC donations in 
1990, 22 were on the marginal list, including the eight with the highest 
totals and 15 of the top 16. Furthermore, marginal list candidates were 
successful in 34 of 45 races. This included a win record of 11-5 in open 
seats, with an impressive 5-5 record where the former incumbent was 
a Republican. Additionally, in the eight races where a Democratic 
challenger of a Republican incumbent was included on the marginal 
list, the challenger won four. 
Because of redistricting, Marta David of COPE expects a 
substantial increase in the number of races which legitimately could be 
included on the marginal list. If unions that in the past have placed 
their financial support indiscriminately with incumbents could be 
persuaded to redirect funds to marginal list candidates, the list could 
be expanded without diluting financial benefits and election success. 
In fact, in the 1992 House elections, the most promising strategic 
alternative for unions is an expanded marginal list accompanied by 
increased commitment to marginal list candidates. 
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